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ALUMNI PROFILES
Studying law in Argentina just after the Dirty War, Professor 
Claudia Martin believes that she was part of a generation that 
went to law school to study human rights. “I never wanted to 
be a traditional lawyer,” Martin notes, “and in the mid-eighties 
democracy had just returned to Argentina, prosecutions of the 
Juntas Militares were taking place, the human rights book, 
Nunca Mas came out, and we all found a reason to be lawyers.” 
Many of Martin’s classmates also wanted to study human rights 
law, despite a lack of professional opportunities in Argentina 
to develop a career in that particular field at that time. Like 
Martin, many of her classmates pursued their careers outside of 
Argentina. 
In 1992, Martin was accepted into the LL.M program at 
the Washington College of Law (WCL). She applied to WCL 
because she wanted to study with Dean Claudio Grossman and 
Professor Robert Goldman, both of who have expertise in inter-
national human rights. Martin came to WCL at a time when the 
law school’s commitment to human rights was expanding. The 
year before Martin attended WCL, the Center for Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law was formed. During her studies, she was 
part of a group of J.D. and LL.M students who collaborated 
to form the Human Rights Brief and the Inter-American Moot 
Court Competition. “In all the years I’ve attended and worked 
for WCL, it was one of the best collaborations between J.D. and 
LL.M students that I’ve seen,” Martin said. These two projects 
have now experienced over a decade of ongoing success.
Martin has devoted most of her career to the Inter-American 
system of human rights. After obtaining her LL.M, she worked 
for the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. At the 
Commission, Martin interviewed victims who filed complaints. 
During her work there, many of the complaints came out of Peru 
and Haiti. She recalls interviewing torture victims, women who 
had been raped, and victims with missing limbs. As a young 
attorney she was eager to seek redress for these individuals. 
“I had so much energy and passion to obtain justice for the 
victims, but I did not have the experience to see the grey areas,” 
Martin said. With maturity and experience, Martin is now better 
able to see the overall problems, including the various elements 
necessary to help victims. Unlike in her early years of practicing 
human rights law, Martin can now “appreciate the nuances of 
different strategies.”
One such strategy is to enlarge the community around 
the Inter-American system in an effort to strengthen it. This 
is exactly what her work as Co-Director of the Academy on 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law  entails. Programs, such 
as the Inter-American Moot Court Competition are life-changing 
experiences for many students who later choose a career in 
human rights because of their participation in the competition. 
“I often hear from people years after they participate, how the 
competition inspired them,” Martin said. In addition to the com-
petition, Martin facilitates the Program of Advanced Studies on 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law — a WCL specialized 
summer program. She also does consulting with the Academy, 
focusing primarily on training different legal actors on human 
rights and the Inter-American system. Furthermore, she works 
to expand the Inter American system community by editing 
the Inter-American System section of the Oxford International 
Law Reports and serving on the advisory board of Oxford’s 
International Law in Domestic Courts database. She has pub-
lished extensively on the Inter-American system and on impu-
nity in Latin America. 
1
Lynd and Roberts: Alumni Profile
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2011
83
Even though Martin claims that she “saw the potential of 
the Inter-American system long ago,” she did not think it would 
have the impact that it has today to strike down laws or receive 
the high level of deference from Latin American countries. 
Yet, Martin hopes that the system will continue to improve. 
Increased funding is key to allowing the Commission and the 
Court to address more issues. The system has done well in 
addressing political and civil rights, and even serving vulnerable 
groups, such as women, children and indigenous populations. 
Nevertheless, Martin believes the system will eventually need to 
address more concerns on economic, social and cultural rights. 
This challenge is part of the ongoing international debate regard-
ing the justiciability of these rights. Martin notes that the univer-
sal human rights system  is beginning to address the same issues 
with the adoption of the  Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
The protocol would create a complaint and inquiry mechanism 
for the ICESCR. Additionally, Martin has seen domestic courts 
in Latin America increasingly address economic rights that have 
either been written into their constitutions or through the ratifi-
cation of international treaties. 
Martin has also observed the debate about the justiciability 
of economic, social and cultural rights unfold in the Human 
Rights survey course she teaches at WCL. “WCL students are 
very interested in learning, and many are already educated 
about human rights, so it is a pleasure to work with them,” 
Martin said. Having been born and raised in Argentina, Martin 
brings a unique perspective to her primarily American students. 
She notes the hesitancy of many students to include economic, 
social and cultural rights as part of the human rights framework. 
Many students believe that adequate maternity leave programs 
are not a right, but merely an extension of feminist thought. 
Martin asserts, “I tell them it is an economic right, because as 
far as I know, we all come from mothers and not from a lechuga! 
[lettuce]” Nonetheless, Martin has great respect for the human 
rights already embedded in U.S. domestic law. She believes, 
however, that international human rights law can refresh the 
domestic debate and push things forward because “you lose 
sight when you are entrenched in your own domestic debate.”
For students who want to work in international human rights 
law, Martin provides a few points of advice. To start, she sug-
gests that students “learn broken English!” If students want to 
channel their interests in human rights law, they should keep 
an open mind, travel, and learn a foreign language. Moreover, 
she counsels students to start early in their careers so that they 
can make the right contacts in a field that is very competitive. 
“When you work internationally you’re not just competing 
against American law school graduates, but with lawyers the 
whole world over,” she said. While Martin advises students to 
become as knowledgeable as possible in human rights law, she 
warns that they should expect and be willing to make profes-
sional sacrifices, such as accepting unpaid internships in law 
school. Martin’s professional success is a testament to this 
advice.
Jessica Lynd, a JD candidate at the Washington College 
of Law, wrote this Alumni Profile for the Human Rights Brief.
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In reflecting on the most rewarding aspect of her job, 
Washington College of Law (WCL) alumnus, Meg Hobbins, 
expressed how privileged she is to be in a position to help her 
clients: “I learn time and again from them what it means to be 
truly resilient and courageous.” Hobbins graduated magna cum 
laude from WCL, and she currently works at Maggio + Kattar, 
a leading boutique immigration law firm in Washington, DC. 
Before attending law school Hobbins obtained her undergradu-
ate degree in Anthropology and Political Science cum laude at 
Rice University. She spent her junior year studying aboriginal 
law in Sydney, Australia, where she also worked with a small 
non-profit organization called Refugee Advice and Casework 
Services as a research assistant. Her work there focused on the 
representation of detained Iraqi, Afghan, and Kosovar asylees 
whose boats were intercepted off the coast of Australia. Through 
her interaction with the clients and working in a “frenzied atmo-
sphere with passionate advocates,” Hobbins felt “instantly at 
home” and knew that she had found her “professional calling” 
in human rights law. Although Hobbins had initially planned to 
attend law school after completing her undergraduate degree, 
she first wanted to gain an understanding of daily life in devel-
oping countries and work on her language skills. Hobbins joined 
the Peace Corps and worked in Togo as a community health/
AIDS prevention volunteer, teaching sex education in middle 
schools and working with at-risk teenagers.
During her first year at WCL, Hobbins was a member of the 
WCL Immigrant Rights Coalition (IRC). She also participated 
in an immigration experiential learning project, and she traveled 
to Juarez, Mexico to learn about femicide for an Alternative 
Spring Break trip. Over the summer, she interned at the Capital 
Area Immigrants’ Rights (CAIR) Coalition. In addition to her con-
tinued involvement with the CAIR Coalition and IRC during her 
second year, Hobbins joined the Journal of Gender, Social Policy, 
and the Law, and was a student attorney for the International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL) Clinic. She then interned at the 
Houston Immigration Court, and worked as a Dean’s Fellow for 
Professor Muneer Ahmad. During her third year, Hobbins spent 
a semester abroad studying international human rights law at the 
University of Paris X.
Hobbins describes her participation in IHRL Clinic as the 
“most important academic experience of my life.” She benefitted 
from “incredible” mentors — including Rick Wilson, Muneer 
Ahmad, and Sarah Paoletti — and worked on behalf of very 
deserving clients. Through IHRL Clinic, Hobbins and her clinic 
partner represented two clients in removal proceedings at the 
Arlington Immigration Court. One of the clients was a Haitian 
domestic violence survivor seeking relief under the Violence 
Against Women Act, and the other was a detained Somali asylee 
applying for a refugee waiver for past criminal offenses. Both 
clients prevailed and became permanent residents of the United 
States. Hobbins regularly draws on her clinic experience in her 
current practice regarding ethics, client goal identification, and 
case presentation. In short, she states, “everything I learned 
about lawyering in law school, I learned in clinic.”
Following graduation from WCL, Hobbins was an Attorney 
General’s Honors Clerk at the Baltimore and York Immigration 
Courts, where she worked for judges drafting decisions and 
memoranda, and assisted with legal research. While at the 
Baltimore Immigration Court, she helped establish a system 
whereby the court would notify the CAIR Coalition of the 
location of unrepresented and detained respondents who had 
upcoming hearings. Because of her love for direct service work, 
Hobbins was initially reluctant to work as a law clerk. However, 
she enjoyed and valued her experience at the immigration courts 
because, in addition to learning about the substance of the law, 
she gained insight about how judges make decisions. Hobbins 
then worked as a staff attorney at the Pennsylvania Immigration 
Resource Center (PIRC), providing direct representation to 
detainees at the York County Prison who faced removal pro-
ceedings before the York Immigration Court. While at PIRC, 
Hobbins also educated recently arriving detainees about their 
rights, and the types of relief available to noncitizens.
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Hobbins’s current work at Maggio + Kattar includes removal 
defense, extreme hardship waivers for individuals who would 
qualify for permanent residency aside from immigration viola-
tions or criminal offenses, marriage-based adjustment of status, 
consular processing for immigrant and non-immigrant visas, 
naturalization, and appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
and the Administrative Appeals Office. On an average day, 
Hobbins does “a little bit of everything,” such as meeting with 
clients, researching and writing briefs, drafting declarations, and 
finalizing filings for submission to courts, agencies, and consul-
ates. Hobbins is a member of the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association and the CAIR Coalition, which honored her for her 
volunteer service in 2009.
Hobbins says that she is fortunate to work at a firm that sup-
ports its attorneys in regularly taking complex pro bono cases. 
Three of her current pro bono cases concern egregious consti-
tutional violations during immigration raids. She emphasizes 
the importance of due process in immigration proceedings, 
particularly given the increase in local enforcement mecha-
nisms. Hobbins wrote an article about the application of due 
process for Immigration Briefings entitled, “A Practitioner’s 
Guide to Motions to Suppress Evidence and Terminate Removal 
Proceedings Due to Constitutional and Regulatory Violations,” 
to provide assistance to other attorneys as they challenge unlaw-
ful government conduct. This work supports Hobbins’s desire 
to see a greater commitment among the immigration bar to 
outstanding representation and client education.
One of the most challenging aspects of Hobbins’s job is 
the often “restrictive and unforgiving” nature of immigration 
law. She would like to see more discretion in various aspects 
of removal proceedings and more flexibility in granting relief, 
particularly for compelling cases that do not fit within the 
narrow categories of the law. Hobbins strongly believes that 
everyone deserves an individualized custody determination to 
ascertain whether he or she is a danger to the community or a 
flight risk, rather than being subjected to mandatory detention as 
currently required for many respondents. She would also like to 
see improvements in collegiality between immigration attorneys 
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in support 
of a shared goal to faithfully apply U.S. immigration law. Most 
importantly, she would like to see progress towards creating 
legal status for the eleven million undocumented individuals 
in the United States who currently live in fear without the full 
protection of the law.
Hobbins encourages students who aspire to a career in 
human rights law to cultivate relationships with members of the 
human rights and immigration law communities. “Every rela-
tionship you form will yield positive results,” she says, “whether 
it is inspiration, advice on a tough case, a recommendation for 
a new position, or an interesting case referral.” She also recom-
mends interning or working in various professional contexts 
because each experience offers opportunities to learn something 
new and become more informed advocates. Although Hobbins 
initially pictured herself working abroad in international human 
rights law, she realized in law school that there was so much 
to be accomplished in the area of human rights in the United 
States that she could have a fulfilling career wherever she lived. 
Hobbins’s experience at WCL and her career clearly reflect her 
commitment to advocating, not only on behalf of individuals 
particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses, but also for 
improvements in United States immigration practices to ensure 
respect for human rights.
Lindsay Roberts, a JD candidate at the Washington College of 
Law, wrote this Alumni Profile for the Human Rights Brief.
4
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol18/iss3/15
86
EnDnotEs: United nations security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and security — Is it Binding?
27 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21) 
[hereinafter Namibia Case].
28 These include Resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969) and 276 (1970). 
29 Namibia Case, supra note 27.
30 Id. ¶ 113.
31 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 39 (July 9). 
32 Id. ¶ 34. 
33 Öberg, supra note 1 at 879-906.
34 U.N. Charter art. 24.
35 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs — Article 25, 
Supp. 1 (1954 – 1955), Vol. 1, ¶1, available at http://www.un.org/law/
repertory/.
36 Öberg, supra note 1, at 885.
37 Higgins, supra note 26, at 279.
38 Namibia Case, supra note 27, ¶115.
39 This conclusion is supported, among other scholars, by Stephen 
Zunes, International Law, the UN and Middle Eastern Conflicts, 16 
Peace Rev. 285, 86-92 (Sept. 2004). See also Higgins, supra note 29.
40 Higgins, supra note 26 at 282.
41 Namibia Case, supra note 31, para. 113.
42 Öberg, supra note 2, at 14.
43 Id at 880-881; see also, Higgins, supra note 26 at 278.
44 S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 8.
45 In particular, the Resolution points to “the obligations applicable 
to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional 
Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the 
Protocol thereto of 1967.” See also Id. ¶¶10, 11.
46 Higgins, supra note 26 at 278.
47 Tryggestad supra note 8.
48 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 at 254–255.
49 Id. ¶ 73.
50 Id. ¶ 93.
51 S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 1.
52 Id.
53 Beijing Declaration, G.A. Res. 52/231, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/231 
(June 17, 1998).
54 S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 2.
55 Michael W. Doyle, A Global Constitution? The Struggle over the 
UN Charter, NYU Symposium (September, 2010), available at http://
www.iilj.org/courses/documents/HC2010Sept22.Doyle.pdf.
56 Ibid, 3.
57 S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 3.
58 Wood, supra note 12 at 86. Though he issues the caveat that the 
Preamble could be used as “dumping ground” for proposals not 
acceptable in the operative paragraphs.
59 See U.N. Secretary-General, Improvement of the Status of Women 
in the Secretariat: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/49/587 
(Nov. 1, 1994).
60 Namibia Case, supra note 27, para. 113.
61 Öberg, supra note 1, at 880-81.
62 S.C. Res 1325, supra note 2, ¶ 6.
63 Id. ¶ 7, which provides: “Recalling also United Nations Security 
Council’s Resolution 1325 (2000) on the role of women in promot-
ing peace and security.” See also U.N. Charter arts. 10, 11 (pertaining 
to right to peace and protection of women in armed conflict respec-
tively).
64 These include S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1820 (2008) and 
S.C. Res. 1888, U.N. Doc. S/Res/18888 (2009) on sexual violence in 
armed conflict; and S.C. Res. 1889, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1889 (2009) on 
practical ways to accelerate the implementation of Res. 1325.
65 C. Cora True-Frost, The UN Security Council Marks Seventh 
Anniversary of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security with 





69 Tryggestad, supra note 8. 
70 These include Spain, Canada, The Netherlands, etc.
71 Contra Tryggestad, supra note 8.
Endnotes: De-democratisation in Israel: Repressions Against Human Rights Defenders and the need  
for Implementation of the EU Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders
16 For a detailed presentation of the anti-democratic bills see: NGO 
report to the UN Human Rights Committee: Palestinian citizens of 
Israel. Response to the list of issues to be taken into consideration of 
the third periodic report of Israel, p. 10. Submitted on 24 June 2010. 
Report submitted by Adalah, Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights and 
Physicians for Human Rights-Israel. http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/
eng/jun10/docs/REPSONE_AAP.pdf
17 See Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel: 
New Discriminatory Laws and Bills in Israel,pp. 8-9, November 29, 
2010.
18 See Jonathan Lis: Knesset passes bill to make Israeli NGOs report 
foreign contributers. Haaretz, February 22, 2011.
19 See Jonathan Lis: Knesset passes bill to make Israeli NGOs report 
foreign contributers. Haaretz, February 22, 2011
20 See Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out war. Israel 
against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.13
21 See statement by Arab NGOs in Israel in February 2011, 
available at http://www.old-adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/
pr.php?file=24_02_11_1; See also MKs push for further pressure  
on human rights groups as restrictive legislation progresses,  
JNews, March, 10, 2011, available at http://www.jnews.org.uk/news/
mks-push-for-further-pressure-on-human-rights-groups-as-restrictive-
legislation-progresses
22 See MKs push for further pressure on human rights groups as 




24 Bill no. P/18/2456. The bill stipulates: “No association will be 
formed if the Registrar has been persuaded that the association will 
be involved with or will convey to foreign elements information on 
the subject of law suits proceeding in instances operating outside of 
the State of Israel, against senior persons in Israel or military officers, 
due to war crimes.”
25 See Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel: 
New Discriminatory Laws and Bills in Israel,p. 9, November 29, 
2010; See also Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out war. 
Israel against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.13-15
26 Article 22, ICCPR, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
ccpr.htm; article 22 stipulates: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with  
others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the  
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protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions may be placed on the exer-
cise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security  
or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health  
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This 
article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members 
of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right.
27 Press release on 29th of April 2010 by the Coalition of the General 
Directors of human rights organizations in Israel (Adalah – The 
Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, The Association 
for Civil Rights in Israel, Bimkom – Planners for Planning Rights, 
B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in 
the Occupied Territories, Gisha – Legal Center for Freedom of 
Movement, HaMoked – Center for the Defence of the Individual, 
Physicians for Human Rights – Israel, The Public Committee Against 
Torture in Israel, Rabbis for Human Rights, and Yesh Din – Volunteers 
for Human Rights) http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/
pr.php?file=29_04_10 
28 The proposed bill states: “One must not initiate a boycott on the 
State of Israel, nor encourage participation in such a boycott, nor offer 
assistance or information in attempt to promote such a boycott”
29 „Besieging Israel‘s siege“. The Guardian. August 12, 2010, avail-
able at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/aug/12/besieg-
ing-israel-siege-palestinian-boycott .
30 See MKs push for further pressure on human rights groups, supra 
n. 22; See also Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out war. 
Israel against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.16
31 See Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out war. Israel 
against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.16
32 See MKs push for further pressure on human rights groups, supra n. 22.
33 Statement of the European Union (22/02/2011) at the Tenth 
Meeting of the EU-Israel Association Council available at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/press_corner/all_news/
news/2011/20110222_01_en.htm
34 For an analysis and summary of all current anti-democratic bills 
and new laws in Israel see The Association for Civil Rights in Israel: 
Knesset 2010-2011 Winter Session: Legislative Roundup. April 2011, 
available at http://www.acri.org.il/en/?p=2033
35 See Harriet Sherwood: Israel proposes Jewish state loyalty oath for 
new citizens. Loyalty pledge criticised as ‘fascist’ and an affront to 
country’s Palestinian citizens, who make up 20% of population. The 
guardian, October 10, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/oct/10/israel-jewish-oath-new-citizens
36 See gush shalom, available at http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/
en/events/1286745470
37 Press release of October 10, 2010, http://zope.gush-shalom.org/
home/en/events/1286745470/
38 Jonathan Lis and Jack Khoury: “Knesset panel approves contro-
versial bill allowing towns to reject residents”. Haaretz. October 27th, 
2010. http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/knesset-panel-approves-
controversial-bill-allowing-towns-to-reject-residents-1.321433
39 See Association for Civil Rights in Israel: Final vote today on 
Nakba Law and Acceptance to Communities Bill, March 22, 2011, 
available http://www.acri.org.il/en/?p=1805; See also attorney Debbie 
Gild-Hayo: “Dark stains on the law books. The chilling effect of the 
Nakba Law will extend beyond the Arab citizens of Israel to public 
bodies of all types.” Haaretz. March 25, 2011
40 Letter of ACRI’s attorneys Dan Yakir and Gil Gan-Mor to Reuven 
Rivlin, Speaker of the Knesset on November 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.acri.org.il/en/?p=1805
41 See Debbie Gild-Hayo: “Dark stains on the law books. The  
chilling effect of the Nakba Law will extend beyond the Arab citizens 
of Israel to public bodies of all types.” Haaretz. March 25, 2011. 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/dark-stains-on-the-law-
books-1.351700
42 Nakba in Arabic means catastrophe, referring to the expulsion of 
Palestinians from their homeland in 1948
43 Debbie Gild-Hayo: “Dark stains on the law books. The chilling 
effect of the Nakba Law will extend beyond the Arab citizens of 
Israel to public bodies of all types.” Haaretz. March 25, 2011. http://
www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/dark-stains-on-the-law-
books-1.351700
44 See for example Coalition of Women for Peace in Israel: All-out 
war. Israel against democracy. Status report. November 2010, p.10
45 See Jonathan Liz: “Knesset revokes Arab MK Zuabi’s privileges 
over Gaza flotilla.” Haaret.July 13, October 2010. http://www.haaretz.
com/news/national/knesset-revokes-arab-mk-zuabi-s-privileges-
over-gaza-flotilla-1.301750
46 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Committee on the Human Rights of 
Parliamentarians
Case No. IL/04 - HANEEN ZOABI - Israel
Confidential decision adopted by the Committee at its 130th session
(Geneva, 12 - 15 July 2010), http://www.adalah.org/newsletter/heb/
jul10/docs/IPU.pdf
47 See “Israel’s democracy. Under siege too. Some liberals say that 
Israel’s vaunted democracy is under threat.” The Economist. June 17th 
, 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/16381128/print
48 Uri Avnery: “A parliamentary mob. Inside the Israeli Knesset.” 
Counterpunch. July 20, 2010. http://www.counterpunch.org/
avnery07202010.html
49 See Amnesty International, Palestinian Human Rights Activist 









53 Press release available at http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/west-
bank/documents/news/20102010_abdallahaburahma_en.pdf
54 Answer Nr. 8 of the German government to a minor interpellation 
of Annette Groth, Bundestag printed paper Nr. 17/2553, July 9th, 2010 
55 See for example Amnesty International General Report 2010 (in 
German). Section on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Teritories, p. 
218. Frankfurt am Main 2010.
56 Answer Nr. 8 of the German government to a minor interpellation 
of Annette Groth, Bundestag printed paper Nr. 17/2553, July 9th, 2010 
57 Ninth report of the German government’s human rights politics (in 
German), covering the period March 1st 2008- February 28th 2010, pp. 
106-107
58 Answer Nr. 5 of the German government to a minor interpellation 
of Annette Groth, Bundestag printed paper Nr. 17/2553, July 9th, 2010 
59 Ninth report of the German government’s human rights politics (in 
German), covering the period March 1st 2008- February 28th 2010, pp. 
111
60 Answer of the German government to a minor interpellation of 
Annette Groth, Bundestag printed paper Nr. 17/2553, July 9th, 2010
61 Lecture of Sahar Francis from Addameer in the German Bundestag 
in November 2010. 
62 See Robert Fisk: “Israel has crept into the EU without anyone 
noticing.” The independent. July 31st 2010. http://www.independent.
co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-israel-has-crept-into-the-
eu-without-anyone-noticing-2040066.html
63 See report by Tsafrir Cohen (representative of medico international 
in Israel & Palestine): “ Israel: de-democratisation (in German)”. 
medico-Rundschreiben II 2010. July 1st, 2010. http://www.medico.de/
material/rundschreiben/2010/02/die-innere-entdemokratisierung/from 
1 July 2010. 
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64 Article two of the agreements stipulates: “Relations between the 
Parties, as well as all the provisions of the Agreement itself, shall be 
based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, which 
guides their internal and international policy and constitutes an essen-
tial element of this Agreement.” available at http://www.worldtrad-
elaw.net/fta/agreements/ecisrfta.pdf
Endnotes: Liberté Religieuse en Europe: Discussing the French Concealment Act
18 Id.
19 Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: 
Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergences, 30 
Cardozo L. REv. 2629, 2642 (2009).
20 Id.
21 Doreen Carvajal, Sarkozy Backs Drive to Eliminate the Burqua, 
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